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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
P l a i i it i :l::l: Appel J c i .en III' • imfiR CA 
V. : 
LINDA EDENFIEL.il,, : Pr iority No. 2 
Def endci..'-, / Appelj-a.. 
BRIEF OF APPFL; •*'• 
J U R I S D I C T I O N AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING., 
This is ar, appeal frc^ a conviciion r;:x possession of a 
controlled subr^^r^c- '^f ha™phet~amin^ • • ^run fv^e zone 
second degree __ 
8(2) (a) (i ) ::rrid i h - ? ^ (r i ";H 
Thi ^  ^— ~ *--^  •^ ••risd4 rt i^n to heai the appeal under 
Utan — ~-~ .« 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND DARDS OF REVIEW 
- "- fendant's detent i-rr E .rrrrf-^ ^v reasonable 
suspicion
 w; *.-* ^:^ -lvemenf in a d. :^. ....- _ cheme. 
A ti:a. -J ,,:t**- determination of *\r.etJiei *n 
' ' * deten*" ~ ~~ • •"irrr'T" ^  - reasonable 
suspi^<j** -- - ^ -^w,-^-,. ..v.j. for 
correctness ~:_e v. Pe.. - 2d 932, «'<9 (Utah 1994) The 
i
 s rulin- ?hr*:"M *--* WWCVO-L, * *- ^ t—rscted to "a 
v-xOoc u^ . ^ r e v i e ~™e-r- finmp
 f , % ; e is accorded 
the tr ial court because the reasonable suspicion standard itself 
they can "grapple witl i the i iiultitude of fact pattei ns that may 
constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination." Id. at 939-40. 
In contrast, the trial court's findings of purely factual issues 
that underlie its reasonable suspicion determination, such as 
witness credibility and historical facts, are subject to reversal 
only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 93 9 n.4. 
2. Was the warrant authorizing the search of 
defendant's person supported by probable cause? 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing 
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial 
basis" for determining that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 
1107, 1110 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
In conducting its examination, the reviewing court "should 
consider a search warrant affidavit 'in its entirety and in a 
common-sense fashion.'" Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)); State v. Purser, 
828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). "Finally, the reviewing 
court should pay 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision." 
Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 236 (1983)). 
3. Assuming the search warrant affidavit was for some 
reason technically deficient, did the trial court properly admit 
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This Court v,eviov ^ Vi **• ' ^ r *" i'"^  f~ * whe^he^ =' 
officer acte- "in ann . .. _ : -
v. Horton, 848 F 2a ' S, '>: 1 .Ut^ :: AL : ;t, denied, b'i,' F.2d 
948 (Utah 1993x . 
CuiNJbi.i^ o-^ OJNAJL FKUVibiuNS. STATUTES AN D RULES 
I Amend IV: 
Trie n-j:. ;;.. people to be secure in their 
persons, ; :^ses; papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
• upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS? E 
Defendant was charged witr *w -* . L ^ W ^ ^ substance 
violation? . • : r;;; !iee zone, under Utah 'ode Ann. §§ 58-37-
nieLncimphetamine a -c^cno aegree felony ctn^  possestn.. . i 
marihuana a class £ misdemeanor. Additionally defendant was 
class A misdemeanor \iulatioi •- . > _>o 
~
 x^, and £8-37 M - S ^9^4 ^ - . x 
during a warrant -s~;. ported search ul .v . ;.-/s^ i, eging that 
the evidence was seized *n violation of hei fede; .-» _ and state 
1 rr;. ... record is numbered J- **everse chronological c: 
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constitutional rights (R. 20, 33-34) . Following a hearing on the 
matter, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 42-37 
(Memorandum Decision), 49-44 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law)). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea 
to possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second 
degree felony (R. 76, 74-69). The remaining counts were 
dismissed (R. 76). The trial court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of one to 15 years (R. 80-79). The court 
suspended execution of the prison term and placed defendant on a 
36 month probationary term. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Search Warrant Affidavit 
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit.2 The affidavit was submitted by Sergeant Mike 
Blackhurst of the Pleasant Grove Police Department, an 
experienced narcotics investigator (BR. 12-11) (see Addendum A), 
and had been reviewed by a county attorney (BR. 14) (see Addendum 
A) . 
Sergeant Blackhurst sought a warrant to search 
defendant's and codefendant Blomquist's persons', defendant's 
Corvette, and Blomquist's residence for "controlled substances, 
paraphernalia# . . . buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other 
2
 The search warrant, affidavit and return are located in 
the companion record of State v. Blomquist, Case No. 940369-CA at 
(BR. 15-8) (copies are attached as Addendum A). 
4 
contraband associated with controlled substances" (BR. 13) (see 
Addendum A). 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant set 
forth information gleaned over an approximate eight month period, 
from September 1992 to March 11, 1993, when the search warrant 
was issued. Information was obtained from fellow officers, 
confidential and anonymous informants, court records and 
surveillance of Blomquist s residence. 
1. Confidential and Anonymous Informants 
In September 1992, Detective Leavitt received 
information from a confidential informant that Blomquist was 
involved in the distribution of controlled substances (BR. 11) 
(see Addendum A). Detective Leavitt believed the information to 
be reliable because the informant had supplied reliable 
information concerning drug distribution on four previous 
occasions. Id. 
Five months later, on January 28, 1993, Sergeant 
Blackhurst received additional information from an anonymous 
informant who reported that defendant "was driving to the Las 
Vegas area in a [t]an and [b]rown Chevrolete [sic] Corvette 
to pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to 
[Blomquist]" (BR. 11) (see Addendum A). According to the 
anonymous informant, the "trips occur[red] approximately every 
two weeks, and [defendant] carrie[d] a gun concealed in a 
compartment behind her seat." Id. 
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On March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst received 
information from another anonymous informant who reported that 
he/she had overheard Blomquist speaking on the telephone and that 
Blomquist had stated that defendant "would be delivering a load 
within the next five to six days" (BR. 11) (see Addendum A). 
2. Investigation and Surveillance 
Police confirmed that a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette with a 
Nevada State license plate was registered to defendant (BR. 9) 
(see Addendum A). Police then began a periodic surveillance of 
Blomquist's residence on March 4, 1993 (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). 
Defendant's Corvette was not observed at Blomquist's residence on 
that date; however, the Corvette was observed at Blomquist's 
residence on March 11, 1994, within 24 hours of her estimated 
time of arrival. Id. 
Additionally, during the period of surveillance a 
vehicle registered to Linda lorg was observed at Blomquist's 
residence (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). Sergeant Fox recalled that 
he had previously executed a search warrant at the lorg residence 
in 1989 and that Iorg's son had been charged with several counts 
of distribution of controlled substances as a result of that 
search. Id. 
3• Corroborative Criminal Histories 
The affidavit also set forth the defendants' criminal 
histories. Defendant's criminal history revealed that she had 
been charged but not convicted for controlled substances 
violations in 1988 and 1989 (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). 
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Blomquist's criminal history revealed a drug related conviction 
in March 1984. Further, there was a misdemeanor warrant for 
Blomquist's arrest out of Pleasant Grove City Court. Id. 
B. Pre-warrant Stop and Detention 
On the basis of the foregoing, Sergeant Blackhurst 
sought a search warrant on the morning of March 11, 1993 (BR. 14-
13) (see Addendum A). Prior to the warrant's issuance, at 
approximately 9:00 a.m., police began surveillance of Blomquist's 
house which was to continue up until Sergeant Blackhurst returned 
with the signed search warrant (Tr. Aug. 26, 1993 at 37, 50).3 
While police were watching the house, at approximately 10:30 
a.m., defendants were observed leaving the house and driving off 
in Blomquist's pickup truck (Tr. 6). 
When notified of the defendants' activity, Sergeant 
Blackhurst told the surveilling officers to stop them (Tr. 50). 
He further instructed that no action should be taken with regard 
to defendant until the search warrant was signed (Tr. 37). 
Accordingly, a marked patrol car stopped Blomquist's pickup 
shortly after it left a nearby convenience store (Tr. 7). 
Blomquist, who was driving the pickup, was immediately 
asked to step out of the pickup and was arrested on the 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant (Tr. 8). Defendant was similarly 
requested to exit the pickup and was detained approximately five 
minutes until police confirmed that the search warrant had been 
3
 The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped 
with record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to 
the internal page numbers. 
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signed (Tr. 8, 15). Because they were awaiting the search 
warrant at the time of the stop, several officers responded to 
assist (Tr. 13). Three police vehicles were present, the marked 
car effecting the stop and two unmarked cars. No guns were drawn 
during the course of the stop (Tr. 14). 
Moments after the initial stop, Sergeant Blackhurst 
notified Officer Cullimore, who assisted in the stop, that the 
search warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 16, 38).4 He further 
instructed Officer Cullimore that defendants should be 
transported to the jail and searched (Tr. 8). Sergeant 
Blackhurst then proceeded directly to Blomquist's house with the 
search warrant where he arrived in the next 10-15 minutes (Tr. 
39, 41, 51). Officer Harris, who was waiting at the house, noted 
that they had the search warrant in hand, at Blomquist's house, 
by 11:39 a.m. (Tr. 29-30). 
C. Search Results 
In the meantime, defendants' were transported and 
searched at the jail. No evidence was seized directly from 
either defendant's person; however, a search of defendant's purse 
revealed methamphetamine (Tr. 18). The search of Blomquist's 
4
 On signing the search warrant, Judge Dimick noted the 
time as 11:30 a.m. (BR. 8) (see Addendum A). Sergeant Blackhurst 
did not note the exact time the warrant was signed, but based on 
his memory of the sequence of events, believed the judge was 
mistaken in his notation of the time (Tr. 41). In any event, 
Sergeant Blackhurst did not advise Officer Cullimore to take 
defendant in for questioning until after the search warrant had 
been signed (Tr. 43). Officer Cullimore noted that Sergeant 
Blackhurst contacted and notified him that the warrant had been 
signed prior to 11:00 a.m. (Tr. 16) . 
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residence turned up numerous items of drug paraphernalia, pills, 
leafy and seed marijuana and cocaine crystals and residue. Drug 
paraphernalia was similarly seized from defendant's Corvette (BR. 
15) (see Addendum A)• 
D. Motion to Suppress 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the 
ground that the search warrant lacked probable cause in violation 
of federal and state constitutional provisions (R. 20, 33-34) . 
In a supporting memorandum, defendants asserted the" the 
affidavit failed to demonstrate the reliability or one 
confidential and two anonymous informants; that the iniwrmation 
was stale; and that the criminal histories of the defendants were 
irrelevant (R. 27-23). In argument before the trial court, 
defense counsel focused primarily on the legality of the 
officer's detention of defendant (Tr. 61-63) . 
E. Denial of Motion to Suppress 
The trial court denied defendants' motion on September 
15, 1993 (R. 42-37 (Memorandum Decision)). Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were filed on October 14, 1993 (R. 49-44). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the 
Narcotics Enforcement Team received 
information from a trusted and reliable 
confidential informant that Defendant Roger 
Blomquist was involved in the distribution 
and use of controlled substances. 
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous 
informant provided information that Linda 
Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, 
was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown 
Chevrolet Corvette to obtain controlled 
9 
substances to deliver back to Roger 
Blomquist. 
3. The anonymous informant said the trips 
occurred every two weeks and that Edenfield 
carried a gun concealed in a compartment 
behind her seat. 
4. In March of 1993, officers received 
information from a third informant who 
claimed to have overheard a telephone 
2conversation in which Blomquist stated that 
Edenfield would be delivering a load within 
the next five to six days. 
5. After receiving the information on March 
4, 1993, officers began surveillance of the 
residence of Blomquist and discovered that 
the tan and brown Corvette was not at the 
residence. 
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until 
March 10, 1993. During the period of 
surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda 
Iorg was seen parked at the home. 
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of 
controlled substances in 1989.5 Roger 
Blomquist was also found to have had a 
criminal record involving controlled 
substances with a conviction in March 1984. 
8. Officers determined that an active 
warrant for the arrest of Roger Blomquist 
existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
9. The name Linda Edenfield was also checked 
and it was determined that there were several 
narcotics related convictions appearing on 
the record.6 
5
 The Court's finding is inaccurate. Linda Iorg's home 
was the subject of a search warrant in 1989. Following the 
search, Linda Iorg's son was arrested on several drug related 
charges (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). 
6
 The Court's finding is inaccurate. The affidavit makes 
clear that codefendant had several controlled substance related 
arrests, but no convictions (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). 
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10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada 
license number 693EPS was registered to Linda 
Edenfield. 
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the 
information obtained by the officers was put 
together in an affidavit and taken to Judge 
Dimick of the Orem Circuit Court who executed 
a search warrant authorizing [a] search of 
the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette 
registered to Linda Edenfield, the person of 
Linda Edenfield, and the person of Roger 
Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and 
affidavit are attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference. 
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced 
surveillance of the Blomquist residence. 
Officer Blackhurst was in the process of 
acquiring the search warrant described above. 
While the Blomquist residence was under 
surveillance the [d]efendants, Linda 
Edenfield and Roger Blomquist, left the 
residence and entered a vehicle owned by 
[d]efendant Blomquist. 
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped 
sometime around 10:30 a.m. Blomquist was 
arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was 
detained briefly until officers received 
information that the search warrant had been 
signed. 
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to 
the Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield 
was searched pursuant to the warrant. 
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the 
Edenfield vehicle were searched until the 
search warrant was appropriately executed by 
Judge Dimick. 
16. The purse of Defendant Edenfield was 
with her when the vehicle was stopped and 
taken with her to the police station. The 
purse was part of her person and 
appropriately searched pursuant to the search 
warrant. 
17. The stop of Roger Blomquist and the 
execution of the arrest warrant and execution 
11 
of the search warrant were essentially 
contemporaneous. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the totality of the circumstances 
analysis the facts as established in the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant 
established adequate probable cause to 
support the search warrant issued. 
Information from separate sources was 
corroborative and consistent providing a 
sufficient basis for the magistrate to 
conclude that there was fair probability that 
the evidence sought would be found in the 
car, in the house, or on the person of the 
individuals described. 
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the 
temporary detention of the [d] efendants prior 
to the physical arrival of the search warrant 
was appropriate because of the mobility of 
the [d]efendants and the likelihood that they 
may have had evidence upon their person. 
3. All officers involved in this operation 
acted in a good faith attempt to comply with 
the Rules of Evidence and Constitution of the 
United States. Officers acted reasonably and 
prudently to prevent the loss or destruction 
of expected evidence without inappropriate 
intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects. 
4. The initial seizure of the person of 
Linda Edenfield was lawful under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
5. The method employed by the officers was 
reasonable and employed in a reasonable 
manner in that the officers had an obvious 
and legitimate concern when the suspects left 
the home and entered a vehicle that evidence 
would leave with them. The immediate stop 
and detention without further search until 
they had received information that the search 
warrant being sought at the present time was 
executed was appropriate. No lesser 
intrusion would have preserved the evidence. 
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No more intrusive action was undertaken until 
the fact that the warrant had been signed was 
confirmed. 
6. Police officers had received a valid 
search warrant based upon evidence 
independent of the stop and detention of 
Edenfield. Even if the search took place 
before the warrant was obtained the fact that 
a warrant was obtained made discovery of the 
evidence inevitable and the evidence should 
not be suppressed even if it were to be 
determined by this Court that the search took 
place before execution of the warrant. 
Id. (a copy is attached as Addendum B). 
Defendants filed objections to the court's findings 
essentially re-arguing the basis of their motion to suppress (R. 
61-56), and filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling (R. 
61.7-61.1)# based on State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 
1993). The trial court denied defendants' motion on November 2, 
1993, on the ground that Potter had not altered existing law 
regarding the issuance of search warrants (R. 64) (a copy is 
attached as Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's brief detention after police stopped the 
pickup truck in which she was riding as a passenger was based on 
at least a reasonable suspicion of her involvement in a drug 
trafficking scheme. Therefore, her detention was 
constitutionally justified. Further, defendant's approximate 
five minute detention facilitated the well recognized judicial 
preference for warrant-supported searches by allowing police to 
maintain the status quo and to preserve the suspected contraband 
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while awaiting confirmation that a search warrant for defendant's 
person had in fact been issued. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant 
Blackhurst's affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the 
magistrate to determine that there was current probable cause to 
search defendant's person for evidence of drug trafficking. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Three independent 
informants implicated defendant and Blomquist in a drug 
trafficking scheme involving defendant's transportation of 
controlled substances from Nevada to Utah in her Corvette. This 
information was corroborated by independent police investigation 
including police observation of defendant's suspected delivery of 
controlled substances in her Corvette to Blomquist's residence on 
the very day the search warrant was sought and obtained. 
Notwithstanding, should the Court conclude that 
probable cause to search defendant's person and Corvette was not 
clearly articulated, any defect in the affidavit is not so 
obvious that the police "had no reasonable grounds for believing 
that the warrant was properly issued." United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). None of the facial deficiencies that 
negate objective good faith exist here. Nor is this a case 
wherein the issuing magistrate was mislead by knowingly or 
recklessly false information. Accordingly, police reliance on 
the warrant issued was objectively reasonable, and the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding 
the challenged evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, PRE-WARRANT DETENTION WAS 
REASONABLE AND PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Propriety of Vehicle Stop and Defendant's 
Allegation of a Warrantless Search Are Not 
Properly Before the Court 
At the outset of the State's analysis it is necessary 
to clarify which issues are properly before the Court. In Point 
II of her brief, defendant's primary challenge is to the 
propriety of her brief detention while police awaited 
confirmation that a search warrant for her person7 had been 
obtained. Br. of App. at 25. The heading of defendant's Point 
II appears to also challenge the validity of the initial stop of 
codefendant's truck in which defendant was riding as a passenger. 
Br. of App. at 25. However, codefendant Blomquist conceded the 
validity of the stop as applied to him in his brief on appeal, 
recognizing that the outstanding warrant for his arrest 
constituted at least one proper ground for the stop. Br. of 
Blomquist at 27. Defense counsel, who represents both 
codefendant and defendant, has filed identical briefs in each 
defendant's appeal, compare Br. of App. at 27 with Br. of 
Blomquist at 27, and has not developed a separate argument 
alleging that the initial stop was nonetheless improper as 
7
 Although contraband was also seized from defendant's 
Corvette, criminal charges based on that seizure were dismissed 
pursuant to the plea bargain agreement (R. 76). 
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applied to defendant. Id. Accordingly, the State's analysis 
assumes the validity of the initial stop. 
As for defendant's further contention both in the 
heading and body of her Point II, that her person was searched 
prior to the warrant's issuance, Br. of App. at 26, it is 
contrary to the trial court's written findings and is also 
improperly before the Court. The trial court found that 
defendant "was detained briefly until officers received 
information that the search warrant had been signed," and that 
defendant "was searched pursuant to the warrant" (R. 47) (see 
Addendum B). Defendant has not the challenged the court's 
findings as clearly erroneous. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990). Specifically, defendant has neither 
marshalled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, 
nor demonstrated how it is insufficient. Id.; State v. Drobel. 
815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of 
fact on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show 
that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's 
attempt to characterize the search of her person as a warrantless 
search and must instead assume the correctness of the trial 
court's historical findings. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 
(Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 
P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). The State's analysis of the warrant-
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supported search of defendant's person is found in Points II-III, 
infra. 
Turning to the merits of the detention issue, defendant 
cites State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) for the 
proposition that police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain 
her, a passenger in the stopped vehicle, beyond their apparent 
purpose in arresting codefendant, the driver. Br. of App. at 27. 
Defendant's reliance on Johnson is misplaced and overlooks the 
officers' reasonable suspicion of both defendant's and 
Blomquist's involvement in a drug trafficking scheme. 
B. State v, Johnson Distinguished 
Although the defendant in Johnson was also a passenger 
in a stopped vehicle, the similarity between the two cases ends 
there. Unlike the present case, Johnson dealt with a vehicle 
stop based upon the officer's observation of faulty brake lights, 
a traffic violation. 805 P.2d at 762. Under that circumstance, 
the supreme court held that an officer "%may briefly detain the 
vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle 
registration and the driver's license.'ff Id. at 763 (quoting 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989)). The 
supreme court further reiterated that the "length and scope of 
the detention must be %lf'strictly tied to and justified by'11 the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" Id. 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Ultimately, the 
supreme court determined that Johnson was improperly detained 
because the officer developed no reasonable suspicion of her 
17 
criminality during the course of the traffic stop. Specifically, 
the supreme court held that Johnson's detention "was beyond what 
was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop" and was also 
"not justified by an articulable suspicion that [Johnson] had 
committed a crime." Id. at 764. See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) ("Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose 
for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth 
amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity."). 
In contrast, the initial stop of Blomquist's truck was 
based, in part, on at least a reasonable suspicion of both 
Blomquist's and defendant's involvement in a drug trafficking 
scheme. See Statement of The Facts, pp. 5-7 supra. See also 
State v. Hiqgjns, 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1992) ("[The stopping 
of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is 
based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an 
occupant of the vehicle has committed or is about to commit a 
crime.11), cert, granted, 857 P. 2d 948 (Utah 1993), aff 'd. State 
v. Hjqcrins, No. 920494 (Utah November 10, 1994) . Indeed, based 
on information available to police at the time of the stop, 
Sergeant Blackhurst ultimately obtained a search warrant for both 
defendants' persons, Blomquist's house and defendant's Corvette. 
See Statement of The Facts, pp. 7-8 supra. Accordingly, police 
were justified in detaining defendant, even apart from any 
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purpose they may have had in arresting Blomquist on the unrelated 
misdemeanor warrant. Hicrains. 837 P.2d at 11. 
C. Detention Reasonable and Appropriate 
Further, the scope of defendant's brief detention was 
reasonable and consistent with principles of fourth amendment 
law, particularly the strong preference for warrant-supported 
searches, which was facilitated here. Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 236 (1983). As recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court, some 
seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth 
Amendment constitute such limited intrusions 
on the personal security of those detained 
and are justified by such substantial law 
enforcement interests that they may be made 
on less than probable cause, so long as 
police have an articulable basis for 
suspecting criminal activity. 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981). 
The Summers Court held that a warrant to search for 
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it 
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises 
while a proper search is conducted. 452 U.S. at 705. Accord 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) (approving 
suspects' restraint by handcuffing during execution of search 
warrant "to prevent [suspect] from secreting contraband and to 
preserve the premises during the search."). It follows that it 
was similarly reasonable and appropriate, under the circumstances 
here, to briefly detain defendant pending confirmation that the 
search warrant had been signed. Cf. State v. South. Case No. 
930362-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah App. November 1, 1994) 
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(affirmatively noting that police can secure a home while a 
search warrant is obtained). See also United States v. Van 
Leeuwen. 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (29 hour detention of mailed 
packages for purposes of obtaining a search warrant held prudent 
and reasonable under the fourth amendment).8 
Moreover, given the officers' reasonable suspicion that 
defendant had just delivered a load of controlled substances to 
Blomquist's residence, there was substantial law enforcement 
interest in preventing either defendant from returning to 
Blomquist's residence prior to the warrant's issuance and the 
trial court so ruled (R. 46) (see Addendum B). Specifically, 
police had a substantial interest in maintaining the status quo 
and in preserving contraband they anticipated finding on 
defendants' persons, and on the premises. See Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("A brief stop of a suspicious 
individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be 
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the 
time." (emphasis added)). See also State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d 
1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) ("When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only 
the right but the duty to make observations and investigations to 
• But see Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980) 
(noting that legality of temporarily detaining a person at the 
scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant may 
be an open question and then assuming for purposes of analysis 
that the suspect's 45 minute detention while police obtained a 
search warrant was error, but error did not constitute either 
flagrant or purposeful misconduct). 
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determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law." 
(emphasis added)), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977). The 
brevity of defendant's pre-warrant detention further illustrates 
the reasonable and even exemplary police conduct in this case. 
State v. Ficrueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992) 
(fact that entire pre-arrest detention lasted less than three 
minutes held a further indication of reasonableness). 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FCR THE MAGISTRATE'S 
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
The magistrate had a substantial basis for determining 
that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search 
warrant for defendant's person and Corvette. The affidavit was 
not rendered inadequate due to allegedly unreliable and stale 
information.9 Quite the contrary, the affidavit set forth 
9
 Defendant broadly asserts that the instant warrant was 
an "anticipatory warrant." Br. of App. at 18-19, relying 
primarily on United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 
1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). Garcia defines an 
anticipatory warrant as "a warrant that has been issued before 
the necessary events have occurred which will allow a 
constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not 
transpire, the warrant is void." 882 F.2d at 702. Cf. State v. 
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111-12 (Utah 1985) (discussing propriety of 
a preprepared affidavit). However, the present facts do not 
support defendant's claim; rather, all of the events set forth in 
Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit occurred prior to the affidavit's 
presentation to Judge L ~ ick (BR. 15-8) (see addendum A). 
Consequently, defendant nas not and cannot show that the instant 
warrant was in any way an "anticipatory warrant." Accordingly, 
the State responds solely to defendant's allegations concerning 
the adequacy of probable cause. 
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mutually reinforcing allegations obtained from one confidential 
informant and two anonymous informants, as well as corroborative 
information gained through independent police investigation. 
A. Informant Reliability 
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists. 
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). However, "[t] hey 
are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly 
extracted' in every case." State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their 
significance varies under the circumstances of each case. 
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 
1205 (Utah 1984)). For example, "if the circumstances as a whole 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less 
strong showing is required." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Such a 
circumstance is found when corroborative information is provided 
by multiple confidential informants. Even if an individual 
informant's information is inadequate by itself to establish 
probable cause, it may nonetheless help to establish probable 
cause when corroborated by additional independent sources. State 
v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993). 
1. Three Independent and Corroborative 
Sources 
Accordingly, it is significant that three separate 
informants supplied information appearing in the present 
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affidavit and that the information was mutually reinforcing and 
corroborative. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) 
("Corroboration through other sources of information reduce[s] 
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale"),10 overruled 
on other grounds, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Specifically, while the 
confidential informant simply reported that Blomquist was 
involved in drug trafficking, the anonymous informants 
corroborated that information with details implicating defendant 
in the scheme. The first anonymous informant reported that 
defendant made biweekly drug runs to Las Vegas in her Corvette 
and the second anonymous informant reported the approximate date 
of defendant's delivery of the next "load" of controlled 
substances (BR. 11) (see Addendum A). Due to the interlocking 
nature of the tips, the issuing magistrate reasonably relied upon 
all three reports in his probable cause determination. Id. 
2. Informant's Provided Nothing in Exchange 
for Information 
Notwithstanding corroboration between the three 
reports, the reliability and/or basis of knowledge of the 
informants is otherwise demonstrated. For example, the 
informants did not receive anything in exchange for their 
10
 See also United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 103 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) ("fact that two apparently unassociated persons make 
the same assertion increases the probability that it is true"); 
United States v. Landis, 726 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("Interlocking tips from different confidential informants 
enhance the credibility of each."), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230 
(1984); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1978) 
("When three unreliable but unconnected persons all report the 
same fact, it is probable that the fact is true.") 
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information. This Court has previously recognized that when a 
confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her 
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is 
reliable. State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994). 
Cf. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 ("reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information"). 
3. Confidential Informant Previously Reliable 
Referring particularly to the reliability of the 
confidential informant, his/her reliability is established by the 
fact that he\she had provided reliable information on four 
previous occasions. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983) (indicating an informant has 
previously provided truthful information is an accepted method 
for establishing veracity). 
4. Anonymous Informants Provided Insider Details 
Additionally, the reliability of the anonymous 
informants is enhanced by the insider nature of their 
information. The first anonymous informant was able to supply 
details of the drug trafficking scheme including a description of 
defendant's Corvette, the frequency and purpose of her drug runs 
to Las Vegas, and her ultimate delivery of the controlled 
substances to Blomquist's residence (BR. 11) (see Addendum A). 
The informant's knowledge of defendant's travel habits reasonably 
suggests that the information was obtained either from defendant 
24 
or from someone defendant trusted and was therefore reliable.11 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 245; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
The same can be said for information reported by the 
second anonymous informant who personally overheard Blomquist 
state when he expected defendant to deliver the next "load." 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (informant's personal observation of 
criminality is adequate to establish basis of knowledge). 
B. Independent Verification and 
Corroboration of Significant Facts 
1. Police Investigation and Surveillance 
Informant reliability is also enhanced by independent 
police investigation and corroboration of significant facts. 
Bailev, 675 P.2d at 1206; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. In the 
present case, police verified that the described Corvette was in 
fact registered to defendant (BR. 9) (see Addendum A). Police 
also observed the Corvette at Blomquist's residence within 24 
hours of its estimated arrival time (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be right 
about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he 
11
 Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Sergeant Blackhurst 
testified that he later found out that the first anonymous 
informant was defendant's ex-boyfriend (Tr. 46-47). He explained 
that this information was not included in the affidavit because 
it was not known at that time the affidavit was prepared. Id. 
On appeal, defendant repeatedly suggests that the ex-
boyfriend's tip was unreliable because it was motivated by anger, 
hostility or revenge. Br. of App. at 21-22. Defendant's 
assertions lack record support and/or legal analysis and should 
not be considered here. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1986) (assertions of error that are unsupported by the 
record or relevant authority not ordinarily considered on 
appeal); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This 
Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record."). 
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has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is 
engaged in criminal activity). 
Further, approximately nine days prior to the warrant's 
issuance, police observed a vehicle at Blomquist's residence 
belonging to Linda Iorg (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). Iorg's house 
had been the subject of a search warrant for drugs in 1989, which 
search lead to the arrest of Iorg's son on several charges of 
drug distribution. Id. 
2. Criminal History 
The defendants' criminal histories provided additional, 
independent corroboration of the informants' allegations. A 
check of defendant's criminal history revealed a a history of 
drug related arrests in 1988-89 (BR. 11) (see Addendum A). 
Blomquist's criminal history revealed a prior drug related 
conviction in 1984. Id. 
In United States v. Harris, the United States Supreme 
Court considered the corroborative purposes of a suspect's 
criminal reputation in a search warrant affidavit. 4 03 U.S. 573, 
581-83 (1971). The Court made clear that while a suspect's 
"reputation, standing alone, was insufficient" to establish 
probable cause; reputation was relevant to the probable cause 
determination "when supported by other information." Id. at 583. 
Accordingly, the Court declined to interpret its prior cases as 
prohibiting the use of such "probative information." Id. 
Rather, the Court concluded that it was entirely proper for a 
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magistrate to rely upon the affiant's knowledge of a suspect's 
reputation in assessing probable cause. Id. 
We cannot conclude that a policeman's 
knowledge of a suspect's reputation -
something that policemen frequently know and 
a factor that impressed such a "legal 
technician" as Mr. Justice Frankfurter - is 
not a "practical consideration of everyday 
life" upon which an officer (or a magistrate) 
may properly rely in assessing the 
reliability of an informant's tip. 
Id. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271 (discussed in Harris, wherein 
Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority, held that information 
"that [Jones] was a known user of narcotics made the charge (drug 
trafficking) against him much less subject to sceptism than would 
be such a charge against one without such a history")). Utah's 
appellate court's have similarly held. See e.g. Bailey, 675 P.2d 
at 1204, 1206 (police verification of Bailey's prior convictions 
for burglary and auto theft enhanced reliability of confidential 
informant's allegation that Bailey was involved in current 
burglary and theft); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App. 
1993) (confidential informant's allegations of suspects' 
involvement in drug trafficking found to "mesh" with affiant 
officer's knowledge of suspects' history of narcotic related 
convictions and arrests); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 
(1991) (affidavit held to sufficiently establish named 
informant's reliability where informant accurately detailed 
Buford's prior criminal history of illegal drug use and sale).12 
12
 Accord Commonwealth v. Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1243, 
45-46 (Mass. 1993) (defendant's 1978 narcotic conviction held 
corroborative of informant's tip concerning defendant's 
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But Cf. Viqh, 871 P.2d at 1031; State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952, 
956 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (all overlooking 
corroborative nature of suspect's criminal history and holding 
criminal history not properly part of probable cause 
determination). 
C. Current Probable Cause 
Defendant disputes that the foregoing information 
supports a finding of current probable cause. She complains both 
about the seven months between the initial incriminating tip and 
the issuance of a search warrant, and about the relevance of her 
prior drug related arrests. Due, however, to the significant 
fact that the search warrant was sought and executed on the very 
day defendant was suspected to have delivered a load of 
controlled substances to Blomquist's residence, defendant's 
staleness challenge must fail. 
As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, 
Staleness issues usually arise when a 
significant lapse of time occurs between the 
discovery of information suggesting that 
involvement in drug trafficking scheme); Malcolm v. State, 550 
A.2d 670, 671, 675 (Md. 1988) (suspect's 1980 narcotic conviction 
held to corroborate informant's allegations of drug trafficking); 
State v. Amerman 581 A.2d 19, 30-31 (Md. App. 1990) (threefold 
purpose for including suspect's criminal history in search 
warrant affidavit is to: 1) demonstrate suspect's tendency to 
engage in related criminality; 2) independently corroborate 
informant's allegations of suspect's involvement in related 
offense; 3) demonstrate ongoing nature of suspect's involvement 
in continuous criminal enterprise); People v. Keller, 505 
N.Y.S.2d 802, 806-07 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1986) (arson suspect's prior 
arson arrests deemed relevant consideration in determining 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant). 
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evidence of the crime can be found at a 
particular locale and the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause or the execution of 
the warrant. The concern is whether so much 
time has passed that there is no longer 
probable cause to believe that the evidence 
is still at the targeted locale. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). Defendant fails to demonstrate any such significant 
lapse of time in this case. 
Police first began receiving reports of Blomquist's 
involvement in drug trafficking in September 1992 (BR. 11) (see 
Addendum A) . Five months later, an anonymous informant ri'ovided 
additional details incriminating defendant, including her ongoing 
and biweekly trips to Nevada to purchase controlled substances. 
Id. On March 3, 1993, approximately nine days before the warrant 
was sought, police observed the lorg vehicle (persons known to be 
involved in controlled substances), at Blomquist's residence (BR. 
10) (see Addendum A). One day later, on March 4, 1993, Sergeant 
Blackhurst heard from yet another anonymous informant who 
reported that Blomquist expected defendant to deliver the next 
"load11 on or about March 10, 1993 (BR. 11) (see Addendum A) . 
Then, on March 11, 1993, police observed defendant's Corvette at 
Blomquist's residence (BR. 10) (see Addendum A). With the 
foregoing information set forth in an affidavit, Sergeant 
Blackhurst sought a search warrant that very morning (BR. 13) see 
Addendum A). Because defendant cannot show a significant lapse 
of time between the observation of her Corvette at Blomquist's 
residence and the warrant's issuance, defendant's staleness 
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challenge fails. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260. See also Singleton, 
854 P.2d at 1017-18, 1021 (approving search warrant obtained 
approximately 5 weeks after receipt of most recent incriminating 
evidence) .13 
Further, the affidavit alleges more than just an 
isolated incident of criminality. United States v. Johnson, 461 
F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) ("where the affidavit properly 
recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous 
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less 
significant" to the determination of current probable cause). 
Rather, the affidavit sets forth an ongoing pattern of criminal 
activity; particularly, defendant's biweekly drug runs to Las 
Vegas. As acknowledged by this Court, drug trafficking is widely 
recognized as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal 
enterprise. Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 (citing, United States 
v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that 
drug distribution schemes "are the very paradigm of the 
continuing enterprises for which courts have relaxed the temporal 
13
 Accord United States v. Rowel1. 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd 
Cir. 1990) (continuous nature of narcotics conspiracies precludes 
staleness challenge to affidavit based on approximate 18 month 
delay between procuring informant's statements and obtaining 
search warrant); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597 
(1st Cir. 1985) (approving affidavit alleging defendants' 
involvement in marijuana distribution one year earlier), vacated 
on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); Gardner v. State, 567 
A.2d 404, 410-411 (Del. 1989) (rejecting staleness challenge to 
affidavit based on 10 month hiatus between anonymous tip alleging 
defendant's drug activity and date search warrant was issued), 
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 
1201, 1204 (N.H. 1986) (affirming probable cause determination 
based on informant's allegation of defendant's drug possession 
approximately seven months prior to affidavit). 
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requirements of non-staleness"), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d. Cir.), 
cert, denied, Marin v. United States, 493 U.S. 834 (1989)). 
Accordingly, in addition to its corroborative purposes, see Part 
B, supra, defendant's prior drug related arrests and Blomquist's 
prior drug related conviction were properly used to demonstrate 
that their involvement with controlled substances has been 
continuous over the years and was likely ongoing at the time of 
the warrant's execution. State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 55-57 
(Utah App. 1989) (approximately eight year old conviction for 
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg 
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, a common 
sense reading of Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit suggests that 
there was probable cause to search defendant's person and 
Corvette. The trial court thus properly applied the highly 
deferential standards of review in examining the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. It correctly rejected 
defendant's arguments that the information received from three 
independent informants was not reliable and was also stale in 
favor of the conclusion that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for determining that there was a fair probability that 
evidence of the defendants' drug distribution scheme would be 
found on her person and inside her Corvette. Given the "Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to 
a warrant," Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, this Court should similarly 
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conclude that the magistrate had sufficient foundation for 
determining that probable cause existed. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT WAS 
DEFECTIVE, POLICE EXERCISED GOOD FAITH 
RELIANCE ON THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Even if this Court were to conclude that Sergeant 
Blackhurst's affidavit was for some reason inadequate, the 
evidence seized would still be admissible under the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the trial court so ruled (R. 46), 
see Addendum B.14 
Leon avoids suppression of evidence seized pursuant to 
a subsequently-invalidated search warrant, provided that officers 
conducting the search believed in good faith the warrant was 
valid. Further, the Leon exception to suppression requires that 
reliance on the defective warrant be objectively reasonable. 
Only then is the seized evidence admissible: 
In the absence of an allegation that the 
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral 
role, suppression is appropriate only if the 
officers were dishonest or reckless in 
14
 Defendant did not develop a state constitutional 
analysis of the good faith issue in the trial court, nor has she 
done so on appeal. Therefore, in the event the Court deems it 
necessary to reach this issue, the Court's analysis "must proceed 
solely under federal constitutional law." State v. Horton, 848 
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993). See State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 n.2 (Utah App.) 
(Utah appellate courts "will not engage in a state constitutional 
analysis unless a party briefs a different analysis under the 
state constitution than that which flows from the federal 
constitution."), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
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preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause. 
Id. at 926. 
Although defendant has not expressly challenged the 
good faith of the officers relying on the warrant, she does 
attempt to analogize the instant affidavit to that in State v. 
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989) . The Droneburg 
affidavit relied solely on information obtained from one 
confidential informant. Id. at 1303. Although the informant had 
previously provided reliable information, his/her assertion was 
vague and conclusory, consisting of the bare allegation that 
controlled substances would be delivered to a residence in 
Panguitch, Utah, between the hours of 2:00 and 4:00 a.m.. Id. 
The affidavit was devoid of any corroborative information. Id. 
Because the Droneburg affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause" the State conceded "it was unreasonable for the 
officer who prepared the affidavit to rely on a warrant issued on 
the strength of it." Id. at 1305. 
The instant affidavit is distinguishable from the ill-
fated Droneburg affidavit. Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit set 
forth mutually reinforcing and corroborating information gleaned 
from three different informants, as well as significant 
corroborative information obtained through independent police 
investigation. See Point 11(B), supra. Even if Sergeant 
Blackhurst's affidavit failed in some way to clearly articulate 
probable cause, it was not so inadequate that police could not 
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have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the search 
warrant that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
None of the facial deficiencies that negate objective good faith 
exist here. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 926. Nor is this a case 
wherein the issuing magistrate was mislead by knowingly or 
recklessly false information, or otherwise failed to perform his 
neutral and detached function. Id.; State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 
708, 711 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Consequently, any defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that 
police "had no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant 
was properly issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Therefore, police 
reliance on the warrant issued was objectively reasonable and the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by 
excluding the challenged evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the 
denial of the motion to suppress and affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / T day of November, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
LIAN DECKEI 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1994. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
-' - ' w.' J' J (} r 
SEARCH WARRANT RETURN ' 
M
 ~ j '% 
• j «*•» o 
STATE OF UTAH ) lHa ^ -^  •'.• 3J tfB/^ffi 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
INVENTORY OF PROPERTY TAKEN FROM THE RESIDENCE 6F ROGER BLOMQUISTP 
126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on March 117—»9triy 
authority of within SEARCH WARRANT issued by JUDGE DIMMICK, Circuit 
Court Judge, County of Utah, 1993. 
1. Small metal can with rolling papers, 2 baggies containing 
marijuana, cigarette lighter and scissors. 
2. Razor blade, glass tube with white crystals, glass pipe, 
rolled up in a white towel. 
3. Pill in cigarette cellophane. 
4. Cigarette cellophane with 3 brown pills. 
5. Scales, hemostats, pipe, wire, 3 plastic funnels and marijuana 
seeds. 
6. Hemostat• 
7. Round red tin can containing wooden pipe, white pills in 
cellophane. 
8. 2 straws in Corvette passenger seat. 
9. Marijuana roach, in Corvette passenger seat. 
10. 2 cigarette cellophane packages with marijuana seeds. 
11. Brown vial with white residue. 
I, SGT. MIKE BLACKHURST, the police officer by whom this 
warrant was executed, do swear that I have 
and the above inventory contains a true 
of all property taken by me on the said 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 'b 
1993. 
• * - vx ^ . J L O 
CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199 
Deputy County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84611 
Telephone 801-370-8026 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE ; 
IN THE MATTER OF 
SEARCH WARRANT 
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION : 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO AHY POLICE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's It has been established by oath or 
Endorsement affirmation made or submitted to me 
this 11th day of March, 1993, that there 
is probable cause to believe the fol-
lowing : 
.-"'" 1. The property described below: 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense or is 
evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably located 
upon the person or at the premises also set forth below* 
l^' 3. The person or entity in possession of the property is 
a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to 
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons: 
The persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edinfield. The 
residence of the suspect(s), located at 126 South main Pleasant 
Grove and surrounding curtledge and outbuildings. The residence is 
more specifically described as a white stucco single family 
dwelling on the West side of main street in Pleasant Grove facing 
East. The residence has a dirt driveway of the North side and is 
the first residence south of the intersection of 100 North main 
street. There is a white brick unattached garage behind the 
residence on the West side. 
The suspects vehicle that is described as a 1981 Chevrolet 
Corvette bearing Nevada License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is 
registered to Linda Edinfield. 
You are directed to search for the presence of controlled 
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use 
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other 
contraband associated with controlled substances. 
THIS WARRANT HAY BE SERVED: 
IN THE DAYTIME 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any seized evidence, identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FEOH THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
Dated this 4- .day of 13^1992 at J//^^^>%. ^ 
Magistrate f ^ ^ A ^ " • • 
f J • /• V<- •••- :. '~. * 
•v, : : „--•: ...cf- ?•.-„• 
v-
CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
> PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
) IN SUPPORT OF AND MOTION 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 
-vs- y 
) Case No. 
IN THE MATTER OF A ) 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION > 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1- MIKE BLACKHURST , Being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and says: 
2. That I am a police officer for the Pleasant Grove 
Police Department, Pleasant Grove, Utah County, Utah, 
3. That I have been employed as a Policeman for the past 
twenty four years and that I am currently assigned to the Utah 
County Narcotics Task force. I have received training from the Utah 
State Police Officers Standards and Training Academy, the Utah Drug 
academy, and the DEA drug academy. This training covered all 
aspects of drug enforcement and included substance identification, 
confidential informants, undercover operations, controlled buys, 
undercover drug buys, drafting search warrants, executing search 
warrants, and all other areas of drug enforcement. 
1 have had experience in making undercover drug buys, writing and 
their information, and conducting surveillance. 
4. That in September of 1992, Detective Aundre Leavitt 
recieved information from a confidential informant that Roger 
Blomquist's was involved in the distribution and use of controlled 
substances. 
b. That this same confidential informant has supplied 
information on as many as four individuals who were involved in the 
distribution of controlled substances and that this information has 
been proven to be reliable through other investigative methods. 
fe. That on January 28th, 1993, your affiant received 
information from an anonymous informant who said that that Linda 
Edinfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, was driving to the 
Las Vegas area in a Tan and Brown Chevrolete Corvette. The 
anonymous informant stated that the reason for these trips was to 
pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to Roger 
blomquist. These trips occur approximately every two weeks, and 
that Linda carries a gun concealed in a compartment behind her 
seat. 
7. That on March 4th, 1993, your affiant received 
information from a different anonymous informant who stated that a 
telephone conversation had been overheard in which Roger Blomquist 
stated that Linda Edinfield would be delivering a load within the 
next five to 6ix days. 
8. That with the above information on March 4th, 1993, 
surveillance was conducted at the residence of Roger Blomquist and 
it was discovered that the Tan and Brown Corvette was not at the 
residence. Periodic surveillance was conducted to watch for the 
arrival of the Corvette and it did arrive on March ilth, 1993. 
9. That during the periodic surveillance Sergeant Lee Fox 
observed a vehicle parked at the Blomquist residence on March 3rd, 
1993. This vehicle was bearing Utah License plate #942 BHN, and was 
registered to Linda Iorg. Sergeant Fox recalled that he had 
conducted a serach warrant on the Iorg residence in 1989 wherein 
the son of Linda Iorg was arres+rd on several counts of 
distribution of controlled substance. 
10. That a records check was conducted on both Roger 
Blomquist and his girlfriend Linda Edinfield. It was found that 
Roger Blomquist has a criminal record involving controlled 
substances with a conviction in March of 1984. It was also 
discovered that there was a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest out 
of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
11. That the records check of Linda Edinfield revealed 
that she has a criminal history indicating that she has been 
charged but never convicted with two counts of possession of 
cocaine in 1988, and two counts of possession of controlled 
substance in 1989. 
12. That the vehicle Linda Edinfield is driving is more 
specifically described as a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada 
License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is registered to Linda 
Edinfield. 
13. That the residence of Roger Blomquist is located at 
126 South Main in Pleasant Grove and is more specifically described 
as a white stucco single family dwelling on the West side of main 
street in Pleasant Grove facing East. The residence has a dirt 
driveway of the North side and is the first residence south of the 
intersection of 10(23 North main street. There is a white brick 
unattached garage behind the residence on the West side. 
14. That it is your affiants experience that subjects who 
deal in controlled substance wil commonly keep other items 
associated with their drug business in their possession. These 
items include drug paraphernalia, buy/owe sheets, scales, drug 
money, or any other items that would facilitate their drug deals. 
15. That it is your affiants experience that those who 
deal in controlled substance will often conceal their drugs outside 
of their residence upon the curtledge of their property. 
16. That the materials sought by this application for a 
search and seizure warrant are being held in violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act and are evidence of felonious drug crime, 
wherefore, your affiant respectfully requests that the Court issue 
its warrant for the search at any time of the day of the residence 
described above, and the person of the suspects, Roger Blomquist 
and Linda Edinfield, for the presence therein of controlled 
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use 
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other 
contraband associated with controlled substances. 
^ — 
MIKE BLACKHURST 
AFFIANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day p^flBrsh, 1993, at 
11:3* hrs. r\ /mW^>> ,/ 
ADDENDUM B 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BBaBBEEBssuDBsaBBisssasasssssassssxBasns^ 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Pla in t i f f , J 
V S . 1 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST, and i 
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD, 
D e f e n d a n t ( s ) . 
— ~ - — - — ii • ii • ii - — — - — — ~ — — i — 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
E Case No. $31400386 FS 
Case No.~~931000385~FS 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park 
presiding on the 26th day of August, 1993. The Defendants were 
present in person and represented by Attorney Shelden R. Carter. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, James 
R. Taylor. The Court having heard the evidence in this matter and 
issued a Memorandum Decision does make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the Narcotics 
Enforcement Team received information from a trusted and reliable 
confidential informant that Defendant Roger Blomquist was involved 
in the distribution and use of controlled substances. 
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous informant 
provided information that Linda Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger 
FILED 
Fourth Judical District Court 
of Utah County, St3te of Utah 
CARMA p. SMITH, Clerk 
'V 
DO 
Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown Chevrolet 
Corvette to obtain controlled substances to deliver back to Roger 
Blomquist. 
3. The anonymous informant said the trips occurred every two 
weeks and that Edenfield carried a gun concealed in a compartment 
behind her seat. 
4. In March of 1993, officers received information from a 
third informant who claimed to have overheard a telephone 
conversation in which Blomquist stated that Edenfield would be 
delivering a load within the next five to six days. 
5. After receiving the information on March 4, 1993, officers 
began surveillance of the residence of Blomquist and discovered 
that the tan and brown Corvette was not at the residence. 
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until March 10, 1993. 
During the period of surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda 
Iorg was seen parked at the home. 
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of controlled 
substances in 1989. Roger Blomquist was also found to have had a 
criminal record involving controlled substances with a conviction 
in March of 1984. 
8. Officers determined that an active warrant for the arrest 
of Roger Blomquist existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
9* The name Linda Edenfield was also checked and it was 
determined that there were several narcotics related convictions 
2 
appearing on the record. 
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada license number 693EPS 
was registered to Linda Edenfield. 
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the information obtained by the 
officers was put together in an affidavit and taken to Judge Dimick 
of the Orem Circuit Court who executed a search warrant authorizing 
search of the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette registered to 
Linda Edenfield, the person of Linda Edenfield, and the person of 
Roger Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and affidavit are 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced surveillance of the 
Blomquist residence. Officer Blackhurst was in the process of 
acquiring the search warrant described above. While the Blomquist 
residence was under surveillance the Defendants, Linda Edenfield 
and Roger Blomquist, left the residence and entered a vehicle owned 
by Defendant Blomquist. 
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped sometime around 10:30 
a.m. Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was 
detained briefly until officers received information that the 
search warrant had been signed. 
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield was searched 
pursuant to the warrant. 
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the Edenfield vehicle 
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were searched until the search warrant was appropriately executed 
by Judge Dimick. 
16 • The purse of Defendant Edenfield was with her when the 
vehicle was stopped and taken with her to the police station. The 
purse was part of her person and appropriately searched pursuant to 
the search warrant. 
17. The stop of Roger Blomquist and the execution of the 
arrest warrant and execution of the search warrant were essentially 
contemporaneous. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the totality of the circumstances analysis the facts 
as established in the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
established adequate probable cause to support the search warrant 
issued. Information from separate sources was corroborative and 
consistent providing a sufficient basis for the Magistrate to 
conclude that there was fair probability that the evidence sought 
would be found in the car, in the house, or on the person of the 
individuals described. 
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the temporary 
detention of the Defendants prior to the physical arrival of the 
search warrant was appropriate because of the mobility of the 
4 
Defendants and the likelihood that they may have had evidence upon 
their person. 
3. All officers involved in this operation acted in a good 
faith attempt to comply with the Rules of Evidence and Constitution 
of the United States. Officers acted reasonably and prudently to 
prevent the loss or destruction of expected evidence without 
inappropriate intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects. 
4. The initial seizure of the person of Linda Edenfield was 
lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
5. The method employed by the officers was reasonable and 
employed in a reasonable manner in that the officers had an obvious 
and legitimate concern when the suspects left the home and entered 
a vehicle that evidence would leave with them. The immediate stop 
and detention without further search until they had received 
information that the search warrant being sought at the present 
time was executed was appropriate. No lesser intrusion would have 
preserved the evidence. No more intrusive action was undertaken 
until the fact that the warrant had been signed was confirmed. 
6. Police officers had received a valid search warrant based 
upon evidence independent of the stop and detention of Edenfield. 
Even if the search took place before the warrant was obtained the 
fact that a warrant was obtained made discovery of the evidence 
inevitable and the evidence should not be suppressed even if it 
were to be determined by this Court that the search took place 
5 
before execution of the warrant. 
DATED this /j/ day of October, 1993 
BOYD L. PARI 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
4o 
ADDENDUM C 
4™ DISTRICT CCJ.Vf 
STATE O r I'TAri 
Nov 2 j ^OS 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 931400385 & 386 
DATE: November 2, 1993 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the Court Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling. 
Defendants contend the case of State v. Potter. 221 Ut. Adv. Reports 29, compels this 
court to rule differently regarding Defendants' Motion to Suppress. This court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on September 15, 1993. 
The court having read the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Response and the case of State v. Potter, and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
RULING 
(1) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling is denied. This court does not 
believe Potter alters the existing law in this state regarding search warrants. 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Shelden Carter, Esq. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY G E N E R A L 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 1 5 1994 
Marilyn M.Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CAROL CLAWSON 
Solicitor General 
REED RICHARDS 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
PALMER DEPAULIS 
Director of Public Policy & Communications 
November 15, 1994 
Marilyn Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Edenfield, Case No. 940368-CA, 
and State v. Blomguist, Case No. 940369-CA. 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Since the filing of the State's responsive briefs in 
these matters, pertinent and significant authority has come to my 
attention concerning the issue set out in the State's Edenfield 
brief at Point 11(B) (2), pp. 26-28, and in the State's Blomguist 
brief at Point 1(B)(2), pp. 19-21. The State cites as 
supplemental authority, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66 
(Utah App. 1987). 
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to 
rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Sincerely, 
Marian Decker 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Shelden R. Carter 
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